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WHO GETS THE FROZEN EMBRYOS DURING A DIVORCE? A CASE
FOR THE CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSENT APPROACH
Sarah B. Kirschbaum *
The increase in the use and success of Assisted Reproductive
Technology has come with an increase in legal and ethical dilemmas
facing courts and prospective parents. In particular, courts in the
past 25 years have grappled with the issue of frozen embryo
disposition during a divorce proceeding. Most couples sign some
form of contract before freezing their embryos. Many state courts,
however, interpret and enforce these contracts differently than they
do other contracts. While approaches to in vitro fertilization
contract interpretation and enforcement already exist in some
states, many states have yet to decide what will happen if a frozen
embryo dispute arises. This Recent Development proposes a
solution that respects the principles of contract law while still
protecting the competing interests of the parties involved.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”) has rapidly
expanded in ways that many courts are continuing to wrestle. While
the media mostly covers the highly sensational disputes between
couples and in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) clinics, 1 a more common
IVF dispute is occurring all over America: the dispute over frozen
embryos during a divorce proceeding. Some states have addressed
through case law or statute what will happen during a frozen embryo
disposition dispute. These states, however, overwhelmingly favor
methods of IVF contract interpretation and enforcement that do not
protect the highly personal, competing interests of couples during a
dispute. 2 Additionally, many states have yet to address the issue at
1

NJ couple sues fertility clinic, saying wrong sperm used to conceive child,
ABC7 (Sept. 12, 2019), https://abc7ny.com/society/couple-says-fertility-clinicused-wrong-sperm-to-conceive-baby/5532537 [https://perma.cc/2TWH-D2S4];
see also Isaac Stanley-Becker, She gave birth to twins through IVF. But the babies
weren’t hers, a lawsuit alleges, WASH. POST (July 8, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/07/08/twins-ivf-birth-lawsuit/
[https://perma.cc/SX6R-C454].
2
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018) (adopting the
Pure Contractual Approach); Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681 (Ariz. App. Ct. 2019)
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all. This lack of clarity and uniformity leaves couples pursuing IVF
vulnerable and subject to significant uncertainty regarding the
disposition of their frozen embryos, even when they sign contracts.
This lack of uniformity persisting in frozen embryo law
impacted Modern Family star Sofia Vergara and her ex-fiancé Nick
Loeb in 2015. 3 After calling off their engagement, Vergara and Loeb
began a contentious two-year dispute over their frozen embryos
created while the two were still together. 4 Vergara was certain she
wanted to keep the embryos frozen while Loeb wanted to implant
the embryos into a surrogate. 5 Over the two-year dispute, the couple
spent thousands of dollars and litigated in multiple states over the
disposition of their frozen embryos. 6 Because of the legal gray areas
that persist in frozen embryo disputes, Loeb attempted to move the
proceeding from state to state to increase the likelihood of obtaining
the outcome he wanted. 7 Although this celebrity legal battle (like
many celebrity lawsuits) may seem far removed from any legal
battle a typical couple may encounter, disputes over frozen embryo
disposition are a reality that many Americans face. 8
Participation in ART is increasing in the United States. 9
Between the years 1987 and 2015, ART contributed to the birth of
more than 1 million babies. 10 Couples choose to expand their
(adopting the Pure Contractual Approach); Bilbao v. Goodwin, No. 20078, 2019
WL 5607809 (Conn. Nov. 5, 2019) (adopting the Pure Contractual Approach).
3
Anna Almendrala, What Sofia Vergara’s Case Reveals About IVF’s Legal
Gray Areas, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2016) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
avoid-custody-battle-over-frozen-embryos_n_584a03dfe4b0bd9c3dfc1a8f
[https://perma.cc/XX5V-NG8H].
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2016 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT (Oct. 2018),
https://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2016-Clinic-Report-Full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PX5-9GW7].
9
Id.
10
IVF by the Numbers, PENN MEDICINE (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.pennmedicine.org/updates/blogs/fertility-blog/2018/march/ivf-bythe-numbers [https://perma.cc/7U64-9ZHR].
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families through ART for a number of reasons. 11 ART is available
for older couples, infertile couples, and same-sex couples when they
may otherwise be unable to conceive through natural means. 12
While ART has had a positive impact in the lives of thousands
of couples, the increased use of this technology has come with
significant legal and ethical implications. Particularly, courts have
struggled with the disposition of frozen embryos during divorce
proceedings. 13 Today, before embarking on their IVF journeys,
couples usually sign contracts drafted by an attorney or supplied as
a part of the IVF clinic consent form that address what will happen
to the frozen embryos in the event of a divorce. 14 Typically, an IVF
contract states the parties’ intent for the disposition of the frozen
embryos in the event of the divorce, and requires both parties to sign
the contract before proceeding with any IVF-related procedures. In
the event of a divorce, most states allow parties to donate their
embryos to research, donate the embryos to another infertile couple,
award the embryos to one of the biological parents, discard the
embryos, or keep the embryos frozen indefinitely. 15
Unfortunately, courts that have addressed frozen embryo
disposition have struggled to remain uniform in their methods of
IVF contract interpretation and enforcement. 16 In states that have
addressed frozen embryo disposition, three different approaches
have emerged: the Pure Contractual Approach, the Balancing Test
Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/
infertility-and-reproduction/guide/in-vitro-fertilization#1
[https://perma.cc/Z8TD-KEFH] (last visited Oct. 31, 2019).
12
Id.
13
Anna El-Zein, Embry-Uh-Oh: An Alternative Approach to Frozen Embryo
Disputes, 82 MO. L. REV. 881, 884 (2017); see also Tracy J. Frazier, Of Property
and Procreation: Oregon’s Place in the National Debate Over Frozen Embryo
Disputes, 88 OR. L. REV. 931, 932 (2009).
14
See Gwen Mayes, “Wait a Minute, I’ve Changed My Mind”—Finding the
Right Time to Determine the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, MEDSCAPE (July 25,
2005), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/508555
[https://perma.cc/
K53T-HP62] (“One important legacy of Davis v. Davis is the incorporation of
written agreements and consent processes from the beginning of IVF treatments
that spell out what will happen should a couple, at a later point, disagree on the
disposition of unused embryos.”).
15
Id.
16
El-Zein, supra note 13, at 884; see also Frazier, supra note 13, at 932.
11
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Approach, and the Contemporaneous Consent Approach. 17
Additionally, many courts have not yet addressed the issue at all. 18
The lack of an established approach in those states leaves couples
vulnerable because it is unclear how their contracts will be
interpreted or enforced if a dispute arises. Courts may choose to
follow one of the existing approaches—which do not always result
in the same outcome for the embryos—or those courts may choose
to adopt a novel approach.
The Contemporaneous Consent Approach, originally proposed
by Carl Coleman in a 1999 law review article, 19 has been
implemented in a few courts, 20 and should be adopted in the
remaining states still looking for guidance. The Contemporaneous
Consent Approach enforces IVF contracts generally unless a party
has a change of heart regarding the disposition of the embryos at the
time of enforcement. 21 In other words, under this approach, IVF
contracts are enforceable if a dispute arises between the couple that
does not address embryo disposition or if a dispute arises between
the IVF clinic and the couple. 22 However, if a party has a change of
heart regarding the disposition of the embryos at the time of
enforcement, the contract will no longer be enforceable. 23 At that
point, the embryos must remain frozen until the parties can come to
a mutual agreement. 24 Thus, with the Contemporaneous Consent

El-Zein, supra note 13, at 884.
Id.
19
Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An
Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55,
88–89 (1999).
20
See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); A.Z. v. B.Z.,
725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2016).
21
Coleman, supra note 19, at 110.
22
See Coleman, supra note 19, at 89; see also Marisa G. Zizzi, The Preembryo
Prenup: A Proposed Pennsylvania Statute Adopting a Contractual Approach to
Resolving Disputes Concerning the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 21 WIDENER
L.J. 391, 406 (2012).
23
Coleman, supra note 19, at 112.
24
Id.
17
18
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Approach, a court will only enforce a contemporaneous decision
between the couple. 25
This Recent Development proposes the Contemporaneous
Consent Approach as the appropriate method of IVF contract
interpretation and enforcement and explains why this approach
protects the interests of couples more than any other approach that
has been applied in courts thus far. Currently, many states have no
case law or statutes addressing the enforceability of contracts
dealing with the disposition of frozen embryos. 26 This lack of clarity
and uniformity in the law leaves couples pursuing IVF vulnerable,
even if they address all issues through a contract because it is
uncertain how courts will interpret the contract or if courts will
enforce the contract at all. Ultimately, understanding how courts
will interpret and enforce IVF contracts will help drafters create
more comprehensive and protective IVF contracts. Having this
understanding will also provide prospective parents with assurance
when embarking on their IVF journeys that their intentions for the
disposition of their embryos at the time of enforcement will be
respected if a dispute arises.
Part II of this Recent Development introduces Assisted
Reproductive Technology generally and explains the process of IVF
and cryopreservation. 27 Part III introduces the three main approaches
courts have implemented when interpreting and enforcing IVF
contracts. Part IV introduces the statutory approaches in Louisiana
and Florida for addressing the disposition of frozen embryos. Part V
establishes why the Contemporaneous Consent Approach should be
adopted by courts still looking for guidance during frozen embryo
disputes. Finally, Part VI addresses some of the drawbacks of the
approach and proposes potential solutions.

25

Id.
See infra Appendix A.
27
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 8, at 533
(Cryopreservation is “the practice of freezing eggs or embryos from a patient’s
ART cycle for potential future use.”).
26
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II.

THE TECHNOLOGY: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY, IVF, AND CRYOPRESERVATION
Assisted Reproductive Technology is used to describe any and
all technology involving embryos and eggs used to facilitate a
pregnancy. 28 The term “embryo” is used from “the moment cells
divide after fertilization until the eighth week of pregnancy.” 29 There
are multiple methods of ART involving embryos, but ART is
generally the process of “surgically removing eggs from a woman’s
ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning
them to a female patient or gestational carrier or donating them to
another patient.” 30
The three most common forms of ART are gamete intrafallopian
transfer, which “involves using a fiber optic instrument called a
laparoscope to guide the transfer of unfertilized eggs and sperm
(‘gametes’) into a woman’s fallopian tubes through small incisions
in her abdomen,” 31 zygote intrafallopian transfer which involves
fertilizing a woman’s eggs in the laboratory and then using a
laparoscope to guide the transfer of the fertilized eggs (“zygotes”)
into a woman’s fallopian tubes, 32 and finally, IVF. 33 IVF is by far
the most common form of ART. 34 Other forms of ART exist beyond
the procedures previously described, but they are rarely
implemented. 35
IVF involves removing a woman’s eggs through an egg retrieval
surgical procedure, fertilizing the eggs in a laboratory, and then

Id. at 3.
Jon Johnson, Embryo freezing: What you need to know, MEDICAL NEWS
TODAY (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/
314662.php [https://perma.cc/733X-TSJ2].
30
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 8, at 3.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 536.
33
Johnson, supra note 29; see also Christina L. Preville, Collaborative Law in
Pennsylvania and the Frozen Embryo Debate, 8 J. OF ENVTL. AND PUB. HEALTH
L. 80, 84 (2013) (“The Society for Assisted Reproductive Treatment found that
99%% of ART procedures are IVF.”).
34
Id.
35
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 8, at 4.
28
29

120

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 113

transferring the resulting embryos into the uterus of the female. 36 For
more complicated IVF procedures, “fertilization involves a
specialized technique known as intracytoplasmic sperm injection
(ICSI). In ICSI, a single sperm is injected directly into a woman’s
egg.” 37 The embryos created through any method of IVF can either
be implanted in the woman immediately or can be frozen for later
use through a process known as cryopreservation. 38
Cryopreservation is “the practice of freezing eggs or embryos
from a patient’s ART cycle for potential future use.” 39 The process
involves replacing the water from inside the cells of the embryo with
a material called the cryoprotectant. 40 Once the water is removed,
the embryos are chilled to their “preservation state” at which point
the embryos reach a temperature at which they will not deteriorate. 41
At this point, the embryos are frozen, and then stored in liquid
nitrogen at temperatures around -321ºF. 42

Johnson, supra note 29; see also 1 Lloyd T. Kelso, N.C. Family Law Practice
§ 9:4 (2017).
37
Johnson, supra note 29. See also In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC,
(June
22,
2019),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitrofertilization/about/pac-20384716 [https://perma.cc/T8JE-GPU2].
38
Johnson, supra note 29; see also In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), supra note 37.
39
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 8, at 533. (“An
ART cycle starts when a woman begins taking fertility drugs or having her ovaries
monitored for follicle production. If eggs are produced, the cycle progresses to
egg retrieval. Retrieved eggs are combined with sperm to create embryos. If
fertilization is successful, at least one embryo is selected for transfer. If
implantation occurs, the cycle may progress to clinical pregnancy and possibly
live birth. ART cycles include any process in which (1) an ART procedure is
performed, (2) a woman has undergone ovarian stimulation or monitoring with
the intent of having an ART procedure, or (3) frozen embryos have been thawed
with the intent of transferring them to a woman.”).
40
Id.; William C. Shiel, Medical Definition of Cryoprotectant, MEDICINENET,
https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=7253
[https://perma.cc/WJQ7-833F] (“A chemical component of a freezing solution
used in cryopreservation to help protect what is being frozen from freeze damage.
The chemical glycerol, for example, is commonly used as a cryoprotectant to
protect frozen red blood cells.”).
41
Johnson, supra note 29.
42
Id.
36

DEC. 2019]

Contemporaneous Consent Approach

121

According to physicians, there is no limit to the length of time
an embryo can remain frozen. 43 There is ample evidence of
successful pregnancies from frozen embryos stored for up to ten
years. 44 It is worth noting, however, that IVF and cryopreservation
are relatively modern reproductive technologies, and researchers
have not yet completed long-term studies on the outcomes of
embryos that have been frozen for extended lengths of time. 45
Couples choose to freeze their embryos for a number of reasons.
First and foremost, cryopreservation makes IVF less expensive for
the couple and less invasive for the woman. 46 The IVF egg retrieval
procedure can be quite costly. One egg retrieval procedure could
cost upwards of $10,000. 47 The hormones used before the egg
retrieval procedure may cost an additional $3,000 to $5,000. 48
Furthermore, the surgical egg removal process is often taxing on
a woman physically. 49 The process includes ovulation induction,
which requires the woman to go through multiple synthetic hormone
treatments and the egg retrieval surgical procedure, which requires
sedation and could lead to cramping and pain during and after the
procedure. 50 So, to ensure a higher IVF success rate and fewer egg
retrievals, many more eggs are removed during the first egg retrieval
procedure to reduce the need for multiple procedures. 51 Because it is
unclear which embryos will be viable, more embryos are created and
frozen than would be intended for actual implantation. 52 In addition,
43

Id.
Id.
45
Id.
46
In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), supra note 37.
47
Sarah McHaney & Rebecca Jacobson, 7 things every woman should know
before freezing her eggs, PBS: NEWSHOUR (Dec. 10, 2014),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/freeze-eggs
[https://perma.cc/8RHPNLGN].
48
Id.
49
Mayes, supra note 14. For a more in-depth argument on how and why women
contribute more to the IVF process, see Tracey S. Pachman, Disputes Over Frozen
Preembryos & The “Right Not to Be a Parent,” 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128
(2003).
50
In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), supra note 37.
51
Id.
52
Id.
44
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married couples may choose to freeze their embryos because there
is some literature suggesting frozen embryos are more viable than
freezing eggs and sperm separately for future use. 53
III.

JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO IVF CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Generally, IVF contracts addressing the disposition of frozen
embryos exist in two forms: a contract is either drafted by an
attorney or it is provided through the IVF clinic consent form. 54 Both
methods of IVF contracting typically address what will happen to
the embryos in the event of a divorce. Regardless of the method a
couple uses to enter into a contract before embarking on IVF, 55 most
couples have some written documentation signed by both parties
addressing the disposition of the embryos in the event of a divorce. 56
Frozen embryo disputes arise in courts when, at the time of
enforcement of the contract (i.e. the divorce), parties do not agree
on the disposition of the frozen embryos. Literature in this area has
classified the various methods of interpretation and enforcement of
IVF contracts during disputes into three approaches: the Pure
Contractual Approach, the Balancing Test Approach, and the
Contemporaneous Consent Approach. 57
To better illustrate how each approach differs from the others,
imagine the following hypothetical scenario: Bob and Jane Doe start
the process of IVF because Bob is about to begin chemotherapy
which may result in his infertility. Because of Bob’s potential
McHaney & Jacobson, supra note 47.
See Deborah L. Foreman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic
Consent Forms Are Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 57, 59
(2011).
55
For a more in-depth analysis on the difference between the two forms of IVF
contracts, see generally id.
56
See Frazier, supra note 13, at 904. Florida has even enacted a statute requiring
couples to sign written agreements before beginning IVF, see FLA. STAT. § 742.17
(2019).
57
Melissa Boatman, Comments: Bringing Up Baby: Maryland Must Adopt an
Equitable Framework for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes after Divorce, 37
U. BALT. L. REV. 285, 288–99 (2008). For a visual depiction of which states
follow each judicial approach and which states have yet to determine an approach,
see infra Appendix A.
53
54
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infertility, the couple signs an IVF contract awarding the frozen
embryos to Bob in the event of a divorce. Years pass and Bob is in
fact infertile now. The couple files for divorce, but Jane has had a
change of heart and no longer wants Bob to have the embryos
because she does not want to become a biological parent. She now
wishes for the embryos to be destroyed. Bob, however, still wants
use of the embryos.
The following subsections will briefly introduce each IVF
contract interpretation and enforcement approach, give an example
of an impactful case from a state implementing that particular
approach, and then demonstrate how a court employing each
approach would interpret and enforce Bob and Jane Doe’s
hypothetical IVF contract.
A. Pure Contractual Approach
First, the most common approach of IVF contract interpretation
and enforcement is the Pure Contractual Approach. 58 Courts
implementing the Pure Contractual Approach treat IVF contracts the
same as any other type of contract. 59 IVF contract interpretation and
enforcement follows the same principles of general contract law,
such as the requirement of mutual assent at the time of the
agreement, with no specialized rules applied in the event a dispute
arises. 60 The rationale behind this method is that competent adults
are free to contract, and their intent at the time of the contract should
be enforced as in other types of contracts. 61 The same safeguards,
thresholds, and defenses available in any other contract dispute are
available in IVF contracts under this method of IVF contract
interpretation and enforcement. 62 Furthermore, this approach
maintains the notion that there is nothing inherently different about
IVF contracts than any other form of contract, thus not utilizing any
specialized rules for interpretation or enforcement.

58

Id.
El-Zein, supra note 13, at 886; see also Frazier, supra note 13, at 941.
60
El-Zein, supra note 13, at 886.
61
Id.
62
Frazier, supra note 13, at 941.
59
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New York has followed the Pure Contractual Approach since
1998. In Kass v. Kass, 63 the court was faced with a dispute over
frozen embryos during a divorce proceeding. 64 Maureen Kass and
Stephen Kass signed an IVF agreement that stated their frozen
embryos would be donated to research in the event of a divorce. 65 At
the time of the divorce, however, Maureen had a change of heart. 66
Maureen wanted to use the embryos. 67 Steven, however, refused this
idea because he did not want parentage forced onto him. 68 The New
York Court of Appeals held that the IVF agreement the couple
signed was enforceable despite Maureen’s change of heart. 69 In
accordance with standard New York contract law, the court held that
the agreement “unequivocally manifest[ed] their mutual intention”
at the time of execution. 70 Therefore, the embryos were donated to
research as established by the original contract despite Maureen’s
changed desires. 71
Using the Pure Contractual Approach, a court is likely to enforce
Bob and Jane Doe’s hypothetical IVF contract discussed above and
award the embryos to Bob, thus ignoring Jane’s change of heart at
the time of enforcement. Because the Pure Contractual Approach
aligns with all of the basic principles of contract law, the court would
be reluctant not to enforce any prior written agreement. In this case,
the only defense available to Jane would be the contract law public
policy defense. Jane could try to argue that the contract forces
parentage upon her which violates public policy. Thus, the contract
should be void. The success of this public policy argument,
however, would be determined under the discretion of the court. 72

Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 557 (N.Y. 1998).
Id.
65
Id. at 558.
66
Id. at 560.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 565.
70
Id. at 567.
71
Id.
72
The uncertainty of the public policy defense as a whole is discussed later in
Section V.
63
64
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B. Balancing Test Approach
Second, some states instead follow a Balancing Test Approach
in which the court may choose to disregard a couple’s previous IVF
agreement and weigh the competing interests of the parties at the
time of the divorce to determine the proper disposition of the frozen
embryos. 73 Using this approach, courts may weigh factors such as a
party’s religion, infertility, and the desire of a party not to become a
parent. 74 In addition, this approach is often employed when no
frozen embryo agreement exists between the parties at the time of
divorce. 75
New Jersey has followed the Balancing Test Approach since
2001. Similar to Kass, in J.B. v. M.B., 76 the court was faced with a
dispute over frozen embryos during a divorce proceeding. 77 The
parties signed an agreement stating that in the event of a divorce the
embryos would revert back to the IVF clinic. 78 The court first stated
that New Jersey “evince[s] a policy against enforcing private
contracts to enter into or terminate family relationships.” 79 The court
then weighed the interests of the wife and husband. 80 The wife,
although infertile, wanted the frozen embryos to be discarded. 81 The
husband, a devout Catholic, wanted the use of the embryos and to
develop them into children. 82 Ultimately, the court held that the
mother’s right not to bear children was paramount over the father’s
wish to have the embryos and ordered the embryos to be discarded. 83
Using the Balancing Test Approach, a court would likely not
recognize Bob and Jane Doe’s prior agreement because of the
personal, familial nature of the contract. Instead, the court would
weigh the interests of Bob and Jane at the time of enforcement
Frazier, supra note 13, at 933.
Id.
75
Id.
76
J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
77
Id.
78
J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001).
79
Id. at 717.
80
Id. at 719.
81
Id. at 710.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 720.
73
74
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against each other to determine what the best outcome should be for
the frozen embryos. For Bob and Jane, the court would likely weigh
Bob’s current inability to have a biological child of his own against
Jane’s desire to not have any biological children with her exhusband. Ultimately, the Balancing Test Approach is highly fact
dependent and how the dispute would come out in this particular
balancing test is completely determined under the discretion of the
court.
C. Contemporaneous Consent Approach
Finally, the third approach is the Contemporaneous Consent
Approach.
This
Recent
Development
endorses
the
Contemporaneous Consent Approach as the appropriate method of
IVF contract interpretation and enforcement because the approach
honors the basic principles of contract law while still protecting
couples’ competing interests during a dispute. The
Contemporaneous Consent Approach aligns with the principles of
contract law but adds an additional safeguard to the process. Using
this form of IVF contract interpretation and enforcement, courts
generally enforce an IVF contract absent a change of heart by one
of the parties at the time of enforcement. 84 When a dispute arises,
the court requires both parties to agree at the time of enforcement
before any final disposition of the frozen embryos takes place. 85
Until a mutual decision is reached between the parties, the court
does not make any decisions regarding the frozen embryos—the
embryos either remain frozen until no longer viable or until storage
is no longer an option. 86 If the parties subsequently come to a mutual
agreement on their own, the court would enforce that
contemporaneous agreement. 87 Carl Coleman first proposed this
approach in a law review article in 1999. 88 In the article, Coleman
argues that the Pure Contractual Approach “insufficiently protects
the individual and societal interests at stake” because there is
something inherently different and more personal about contracts
Coleman, supra note 19, at 110.
Id.
86
Preville, supra note 33, at 90–91.
87
Coleman, supra note 19, at 110.
88
Id.
84
85
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for frozen embryo disposition. 89 Thus, to protect those individual
interests, the Contemporaneous Consent Approach provides an
additional safeguard to the process by requiring both parties to agree
at the time of enforcement before any final disposition of the frozen
embryos.
Massachusetts has implemented the Contemporaneous Consent
Approach since 2000. Similar to the disputes in the Kass and J.B.
cases, in A.Z. v. B.Z., 90 the court was faced with a dispute over frozen
embryos during a divorce proceeding. 91 Before beginning the IVF
process, the couple signed a consent form stating that in the event of
a divorce, the embryos would be awarded to the wife because she
was not able to become pregnant through conventional means of
conception. 92 At the time of divorce, however, the husband had a
change of heart and no longer wished for the wife to be awarded the
embryos and potentially have parentage forced upon him. 93 The
court held that even if the agreement between the parties was valid,
the court would not enforce the contract because one of the parties
had a change of heart. 94 The court thus “would not enforce an
agreement that would compel one donor to become a parent against
his or her will.” 95
Using the Contemporaneous Consent Approach, in the
hypothetical case of Bob and Jane Doe, the court would not enforce
their prior agreement. Because Jane had a change of heart regarding
the disposition of the frozen embryos, the court would order
indefinite storage until the parties come to a mutual agreement
regarding the disposition of their frozen embryos. If Bob and Jane
later come to a mutual agreement, a court would then enforce that
subsequent contemporaneous agreement.

Id. at 88.
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
91
Id. at 1051.
92
Id. at 1054.
93
Id. at 1057.
94
Id.
95
Id.
89
90
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IV.
STATUTORY APPROACHES
While most states have chosen to leave the issue of frozen
embryo disposition to the courts, a handful of states have chosen to
address this issue through statutes. 96 While these laws may be further
developed and interpreted by courts, the statutes provide parameters
the courts must use as the starting point in IVF contract
interpretation and enforcement. Florida and Louisiana are two states
that have enacted statutes addressing frozen embryo disputes. These
two statutes embody typical language legislatures adopt in these
types of laws, but come to very different conclusions on the
disposition options for frozen embryos. Generally, Florida codifies
the Pure Contractual Approach, requiring parties to enter into prior
agreements before beginning IVF, 97 while Louisiana provides
frozen embryos with a legal status by referring to the embryos as
“juridical person[s].” 98 These two states’ statutes demonstrate how
adopting a statutory scheme to address frozen embryo disposition
can lead to significantly different outcomes.
A. Florida’s Approach
In 1993, Florida enacted a statute addressing the disposition of
frozen embryos. 99 The statute states that parties must enter into a
written agreement that provides for the disposition of the
commissioning couples’ eggs, sperm, and preembryos 100 in the event
of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen
circumstance. 101 The statute goes on to explain, in the absence of an
agreement, the parties providing the egg and sperm have control
over the embryo and the decision-making resides jointly with the
couple. 102 The statute also states that, in the event of the death of one

See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367g (2017); FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2017); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121–9:133 (2017).
97
FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2017).
98
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (2017).
99
FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2017).
100
Id. § 742.13(12) (“‘Preembryo’ means the product of fertilization of an egg
by a sperm until the appearance of the embryonic axis.”).
101
Id.
102
Id.
96
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party, the embryos will go to the surviving party. 103 Finally, the
Florida statute addresses that, if a child is born from an embryo after
the death of a party, the child will not be able to inherit from the
deceased party unless the decedent’s will has provided for such an
occasion. 104 This statute suggests that written agreements will be
enforced while also accounting for what will happen if a dispute
arises in the absence of a written agreement.
Despite the breadth of this statute, it leaves its interpretation
open to Florida courts. While the statute appears to be a codification
of the Pure Contractual Approach, it still does not speak to how
agreements will be interpreted or enforced by courts, such as what a
court should consider to be void because of public policy
considerations or whether a court would force parentage on a party
if the contract called for it.
B. Louisiana’s Approach
In 1986, Louisiana enacted a statute that provided frozen
embryos with a legal status. 105 One of the provisions of this statute
establishes that a human embryo is a “juridical person which cannot
be owned by the in vitro patients.” 106 In addition, the statute prohibits
using the embryo for research purposes 107 and prohibits destruction
of the embryos. 108 Finally, the statute provides that any disposition
must pass a “best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum” test before
any disposition decision is enforced. 109 While this statute does not
provide guidelines on whether a court should enforce an IVF
contract generally, it does set parameters for IVF contracts as the
starting point. An IVF contract calling for embryos to be discarded
or donated to research in the event of divorce would not be enforced
because it directly contravenes the statute, thus violating public
policy.

103

Id.
Id.
105
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121-9:133 (2017).
106
Id. § 9:130.
107
Id. § 9:122.
108
Id. § 9:129.
109
See Kelso, supra note 36.
104

130
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This statute, however, also still leaves much to be determined by
Louisiana courts. For example, this statute does not speak to whether
an IVF contract is void on its face because of the nature of the
agreement even if the agreement does not call for the embryos to be
discarded or donated to research.
Although adopting a statute may appear like a simple,
comprehensive approach to address frozen embryo disposition
disputes, the Florida and Louisiana statutes evidence how adopting
a statutory scheme can lead to significantly different outcomes for
states. Furthermore, statutory schemes still leave much to the
discretion of the state courts. Such approaches fail to address the
lack of uniformity in frozen embryo law that persists today.
THE STRENGTHS OF ADOPTING THE CONTEMPORANEOUS
CONSENT APPROACH
Although implemented by only a few states, 110 and thus highly
underutilized, the Contemporaneous Consent Approach should be
adopted in the remaining states looking for guidance on interpreting
and enforcing IVF contracts. The strengths of this approach are
abundant: the approach honors many of the principles of contract
law, thus respecting couples’ rights to contract concerning the
disposition of their frozen embryos, while providing an additional
safeguard to the process to ensure all of the interests at stake are
protected.
V.

A. Providing an Additional Safeguard to the Pure Contractual
Approach
The Contemporaneous Consent Approach aligns with the
general principles of contract law, such as mutual assent and
enforcement if valid. 111 Parties are able to freely enter into IVF
agreements and, if no later dispute arises, their intent at the time of
the contract will be honored by courts. 112 With this approach, there
In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725
N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App.
2016).
111
In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
112
Id.
110
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is no fear that a court would rule the entire agreement void simply
because of the nature of the agreement as in the Balancing Test
Approach. 113 In addition, treating these contracts as entirely void
because of the highly personal, private nature of the agreement
would render any and all IVF contracts futile. Ensuring IVF
contracts are still valid, absent a change of heart, becomes
particularly important in two situations: if the creators of the frozen
embryos get into a dispute, not with each other, but with the IVF
clinic, or alternatively, if the creators get into a dispute with each
other, not over the disposition of the embryos, but over some other
provision in the IVF contract.
Generally, it is necessary that IVF contracts remain enforceable
and still governed by contract law because a valid contractual
relationship should still exist between the couple and the IVF clinic.
In the event the parties get into a dispute with the IVF clinic, the
original agreement should still be presumed valid and the terms in
the contract should be referenced in the dispute. 114
Additionally, disputes regarding the IVF contract may arise
between the parties that do not deal with the disposition of the frozen
embryos. For example, a couple could sign an IVF contract that
states the frozen embryos will remain frozen indefinitely and also
determines that one of the parties would be solely responsible for
paying the storage fees in the event of the divorce. At the time of the
divorce, the couple still agrees that the embryos should remain
frozen, however, the party that originally agreed to pay the storage
fees now wants to split the costs equally. This change of heart does
not affect the enforcement of the IVF contract because it is not a
change of heart regarding the ultimate outcome of the embryos, but
rather a financial obligation of one of the parties. As a result, the
contract should still be upheld, enforced, and governed by the rules
of contract law.
J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
For an example of a dispute between a couple and an IVF clinic, see
generally NJ couple sues fertility clinic, saying wrong sperm used to conceive
child, ABC7 (Sept. 12, 2019), https://abc7ny.com/society/couple-says-fertilityclinic-used-wrong-sperm-to-conceive-baby/5532537/ [https://perma.cc/2TWHD2S4].
113
114
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Furthermore, because the Contemporaneous Consent Approach
still honors the principles of contract law, the standard defenses that
accompany contract law are also available during disputes as
safeguards to the process. For example, IVF contracts may be
voided in cases of fraud 115 or duress. 116 More commonly, an IVF
contract would be voidable if it goes against public policy. 117
Contracts that address frozen embryo disposition, however, are
not typical contracts. They have the potential to implicate private,
familial decisions. Consequently, it is rational that the contract law
defenses, particularly the public policy defense, are not enough to
ensure all of the parties’ interests are protected. Generally, relying
on a public policy defense as the argument in favor of nonenforcement is a risky matter. The discretion of the court plays a key
role in determining what does and does not violate public policy. 118
This leaves much room for different courts to come up with different
rules, thus contributing to the lack of uniformity when a dispute
arises. This lack of uniformity occurs because judges in different
jurisdictions may weigh factors differently in determining what
violates public policy. For example, there is no consensus among
courts whether forcing parentage on a party by awarding one party
the embryos over the other party’s objection pursuant to an IVF
agreement violates public policy. A Texas court in Roman v.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“When A Misrepresentation Makes a Contract Voidable . . .”).
116
Id. § 177 (“When Undue Influence Makes a Contract Voidable . . .”).
117
Id. § 178 (“When A Term Is Unenforceable On Grounds Of Public Policy
. . . (1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against
the enforcement of such terms. (2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of
a term, account is taken of (a) the parties’ justified expectations, (b) any forfeiture
that would result if enforcement were denied, and (c) any special public interest
in the enforcement of the particular term. (3) In weighing a public policy against
enforcement of a term, account is taken of (a) the strength of that policy as
manifested by legislation or judicial decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal to
enforce the term will further that policy, (c) the seriousness of any misconduct
involved and the extent to which it was deliberate, and (d) the directness of the
connection between that misconduct and the term.”).
118
Id.
115
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Roman 119 favored the husband’s right not to procreate, and ordered
the embryos to be destroyed. 120 This court refused to force parentage
on the husband. 121 However, in Terrell v. Torres,122 an Arizona court
held that the right of a mother to have a child outweighed the right
of a father not to become a parent, and awarded the mother the
embryos. 123 The Terrell court did not believe forcing parentage on a
party violates public policy. 124
Additionally, there is no consensus among courts whether
discarding embryos violates public policy. For example, in
Louisiana, if an IVF contract called for the destruction of the unused
embryos or the donation of the embryos to research, a judge would
determine that the contract violates public policy because it would
be in direct contravention of the Louisiana statute. 125 However, in
the case of Litowitz v. Litowitz,126 a Washington court held that the
frozen embryos should be discarded pursuant to the existing IVF
contract, thus indicating that discarding embryos does not violate
public policy. 127
Accordingly, there is no absolute certainty how a court will rule
when the contract law public policy defense is argued because the
decision is ultimately under the discretion of the court. Thus, the
contract law public policy defense alone only leads courts further
away from uniformity in their decisions, leaving parents vulnerable
to the court’s discretion.
B. Acknowledging the Potential Change of Heart
At the time of signing an IVF contract, many couples do not
contemplate divorce. 128 Much can change in the lives of the parties
Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
Id.
121
Id. at 55.
122
Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2017); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2017).
126
Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
127
Id. at 271.
128
See Preville, supra note 33, at 89–90; Mayes, supra note 14 (“When a couple
comes in for IVF, the last thing they want to think about is divorce or
separation.”).
119
120
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between the time of freezing the embryos and the court action,
including the dissolution of their marriage. Parties could have vastly
different views on the disposition of the embryos at the time of the
IVF contract enforcement. Thus, it is far more likely one or both of
the parties will have a change of heart. 129
Under contract law, only intent at the time of the agreement is
binding. 130 Intent at the time of enforcement has no bearing on the
contract. Because of the unique interests at stake, however, allowing
a change of heart is more necessary in frozen embryo disposition
disputes. In practice, the mutual assent of the parties requirement
necessitates both parties’ agreement to the disposition at the time of
enforcement before any final disposition of the embryos takes
place. 131 Thus, the court will not enforce the prior agreement if a
party has a change of heart and no longer agrees to the disposition
from that prior agreement. 132 Neither party is allowed to use the
frozen embryos, donate the frozen embryos to another patient or to
research, or destroy the frozen embryos without both the creators of
the frozen embryos giving contemporaneous mutual consent. 133
Having the additional safeguard of mutual assent of the parties
at the time of enforcement also acknowledges that IVF contracts
dealing with the disposition of frozen embryos are not typical
contracts. IVF contracts have the potential to implicate private,
familial decisions and views that may drastically change over time.
There is more at stake in IVF contracts regarding lifechanging
personal issues, and thus the additional safeguard of mutual assent

See Preville, supra note 33, at 91 (“One study has shown that as many as
71% of couples change their preferences for disposition from their initial
preferences before treatment.”); see also Mayes, supra note 14.
130
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (“A contract must be so interpreted as to give
effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting,
so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.”); Gould v. Bank of New York
Mellon, 123 F. Supp. 3d 197 (D. Mass. 2015) (“[t]he requisite intent, for
an enforceable contract, is the intent to be bound by the contract’s terms at the
moment of the formation of a contested agreement.”).
131
Coleman, supra note 19, at 110.
132
Id.
133
Id.
129
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at the time of enforcement should be in place to reflect and protect
the parties’ potential changed interests and views.
In fact, many states have enacted statutes which require waiting
periods for highly emotional, private familial decisions, recognizing
that views or feelings in these situations can be highly subject to
change. 134 For example, Iowa’s adoption statute provides a seventytwo-hour waiting period after the birth of a child before biological
parents may individually release their parental rights. 135 These
statutes which allow for potential changes of heart in highly
emotional, familial decisions are widespread throughout the United
States. 136
C. Protecting Procreative Liberty by Preventing Forced
Parentage
During a dispute over frozen embryos, multiple complicating
and competing factors and interests of the parties may be present at
the time of enforcement. For example, a party may be infertile and
unable to have any biological children without the frozen embryos 137
or a party may have strong religious views in opposition to
discarding or donating the embryos. 138 While these claims are valid
and may at first seem to weigh in favor of awarding that party the

134
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-13 (2017) (requiring a five-day waiting
period after the birth of the child before parents may relinquish their parental
rights); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 210, § 2 (2017) (requiring a four-day waiting
period after the birth of the child before parents may relinquish their parental
rights); MINN. STAT. § 259.24 (2017) (requiring a three-day waiting period after
the birth of a child before parents may relinquish their parental rights).
135
IOWA CODE § 600A.4(2)(g) (2017).
136
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-13 (2017) (requiring a five-day waiting
period after the birth of the child before parents may relinquish their parental
rights); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 210, § 2 (2017) (requiring a four-day waiting
period after the birth of the child before parents may relinquish their parental
rights); MINN. STAT. § 259.24 (2017) (requiring a three-day waiting period after
the birth of a child before parents may relinquish their parental rights).
137
See Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
138
See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001).
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embryos, paramount interests exist: procreative liberty and the right
to not become a parent. 139
While the right not to become a parent is not a constitutionally
protected fundamental right, 140 there are still areas of life that courts
are hesitant to reach because they are too personal or private. 141 The
view that the decision to become parents is one of those private,
personal areas, and should rest solely in the hands of the parties, not
the courts, has emerged. 142 This notion, that parties themselves
should be the final decision-makers in their own procreation, is
encompassed by the concept of procreative liberty. 143 A court
forcing parentage on a party is in direct contravention of the concept
of procreative liberty because forced parentage takes the decisionmaking power away from the parties and leaves it to the discretion
of the court. Even if a party is able to legally and financially absolve
himself or herself from any responsibility toward the potential child,
thus avoiding legal parentage, 144 a court awarding a party the frozen
For a discussion on the right not to become a parent as an inalienable right,
compare Coleman, supra note 19 with Pachman, supra note 49.
140
For a discussion on why the right not to become a parent is not a
constitutionally protected fundamental right, see generally, Pachman, supra note
49.
141
Miller v. Miller, 78 Iowa 177, 642 (1889) (“It is of the genius of our laws,
as well as of our civilization, that matters pertaining so directly and exclusively
to the home, and its value as such, and which are so generally susceptible of
regulation and control by those influences which surround it, are not to become
matters of public concern or inquiry.”); Doe v. Doe, 365 Mass. 556 (1974)
(holding that there is a hesitancy for courts to become involved in intimate
questions of family life).
142
See generally Christina C. Lawrence, Procreative Liberty and the
Preembryo Problem: Developing a Medical and Legal Framework to Settle the
Disposition of Frozen Preembryos, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 721 (2002)
(proposing an inalienable rights approach to IVF contract interpretation and
enforcement).
143
For a more in-depth discussion on procreative liberty and forced parentage,
see generally Coleman, supra note 19; see also Lawrence, supra note 142.
144
Lee M. Silver & Susan Remis Silver, Confused Heritage and the Absurdity
of Genetic Ownership, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 593, 615 (1998) (“[i]f the nonconsenting party simply wants to avoid having custody or financial responsibility,
a court could convert the party’s status from being the parent of a frozen embryo
to being an ‘egg donor’ or ‘sperm donor’ without the custody or financial
obligations of parenthood”).
139

DEC. 2019]

Contemporaneous Consent Approach

137

embryos over the other party’s objections still forces biological
parentage on a party. 145
Both the Pure Contractual Approach and the Balancing Test
Approach have the potential to implicate a party’s procreative
liberty by forcing parentage. While courts implementing the Pure
Contractual Approach have typically held that forcing parentage on
a party would violate public policy, 146 not all Pure Contractual
Approach courts follow the same logic, particularly because the
public policy defense is so discretionary as discussed earlier. For
example, in Szafranski v. Dunston, 147 the Illinois Appellate Court
enforced a frozen embryo oral contract between Jacob Szafranski
and his ex-girlfriend Karla Dunston. 148 Karla had been recently
diagnosed with cancer when she decided to begin the IVF and
cryopreservation process with Jacob. 149 Both parties knew the
chemotherapy treatments would make her infertile. 150 The couple
had an attorney draft an agreement awarding Karla the use of the
embryos, but the couple never signed the agreement. 151 At the time
of the dispute, Jacob no longer wished to become a parent and
wanted to bar Karla from using their embryos. 152 The court,
however, held an oral contract existed between the parties. 153
Despite Jacob’s change of heart, the court enforced their oral
contract by allowing Karla use of the embryos. 154 Thus, this
implementation of the Pure Contractual Approach implicated
procreative liberty by forcing parentage.

For a discussion on the impacts of forced biological parentage, see Coleman,
supra note 19, at 81–82.
146
See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554 (N.Y. 1998) (favoring one party’s
right not to procreate); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d. 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006)
(favoring one party’s right not to procreate).
147
Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
148
Id. at 1164.
149
Id. at 1136.
150
Id. at 1136.
151
Id. at 1139.
152
Id. at 1141.
153
Id. at 1149.
154
Id. at 1164.
145
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The Balancing Test Approach has also implicated the right not
to become a parent in practice. For example, in Reber v. Reiss 155 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court weighed Andrea Lynn Reiss’s right to
have a biological child over her ex-husband, Bret Reber’s right not
to become a parent. 156 Reiss and Reber began their IVF and
cryopreservation journey when Reiss was first diagnosed with
cancer, and Reiss began chemotherapy treatments that would make
her infertile. 157 Over two years later, Reber filed for divorce and
wanted the embryos destroyed because he no longer wished to
become a parent. 158 The court used the Balancing Test Approach and
determined Reiss’s right to have biological children outweighed
Reber’s right not to become a parent. 159 Thus, this implementation
of the Balancing Test Approach implicated the ex-husband’s
procreative liberty by forcing parentage.
The emotionally charged facts of both Szafranski v. Dunston 160
and Reber v. Reiss 161 may seem to weigh in favor of the Pure
Contractual Approach or the Balancing Test Approach because the
outcomes appear justified. The main inquiry, however, is not
whether the courts were justified in their decisions, but whether
courts generally should have the power to implicate procreative
liberty by forcing parentage on a party.
When implementing the Contemporaneous Consent Approach,
a change of heart by one of the parties ceases a court’s ability to
enforce any prior agreement. 162 Thus, this approach will not infringe
upon procreative liberty through a court forcing parentage on a
party. This lack of enforceability of the contract, however, does not
always mean the party who wants the embryos in one of these highly
emotional situations has lost his or her ability to ever be awarded the
embryos. Under the Contemporaneous Consent Approach, the
parties are still free to come to a subsequent mutual agreement that
See Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
Id. at 1141.
157
Id. at 1132.
158
Id. at 1133.
159
Id. at 1142.
160
Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
161
Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
162
Coleman, supra note 19, at 110.
155
156
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awards one party the embryos in those more emotionally charged
cases. In this situation, though, a court enforcing this mutual
agreement is not forcing parentage on a party because it is the couple
who has jointly decided to award the embryos to one party.
D. Applying a Tested Approach
The final strength of this approach is that it has been tested.
Although first proposed in the literature, 163 this approach came to
fruition in Massachusetts in 2000, 164 in Iowa in 2003, 165 and in
Missouri in 2016 166 through their state courts. Many of the
approach’s strengths and weaknesses have been evidenced through
case law in these states. 167 For example, one of the issues arising
from the Contemporaneous Consent Approach is the possibility that
the embryos will remain in storage indefinitely. 168 Because of the
high storage costs of frozen embryos, a question may arise
concerning who is responsible for paying these storage fees. A court
in Iowa, however, addressed this issue and established a solution
when implementing this approach in In re Marriage of Witten. 169
The court held that the party with the change of heart, thus
responsible for the potentially indefinite storage, would also be
responsible for the fees associated with storage. 170
While many scholars have suggested novel statutory approaches
to address frozen embryo disposition, 171 the Contemporaneous
See generally Coleman, supra note 19 (first proposing the requirement of
contemporaneous mutual consent of the parties at the time of IVF contract
enforcement).
164
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
165
See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
166
McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
167
See id.; A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); McQueen v. Gadberry,
507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
168
Potentially indefinite storage is discussed further in Section IV.
169
In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
170
Id. at 783.
171
See, e.g., Zizzi, supra note 22 (proposing a state statute requiring parties to
enter into contracts before beginning IVF and courts should enforce those
contracts); El-Zein, supra note 13 (suggesting parties obtain outside, separate
counsel to create IVF contracts and courts should enforce those contracts);
Frazier, supra note 13 (suggesting keeping embryo disputes out of courtrooms).
163
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Consent Approach has already been applied in courts and proven
effective in application. 172 States that have yet to establish an
approach do not need grapple with the complications and obstacles
that accompany entirely novel solutions to the same degree because
examples of successful application of this approach are evidenced
in the case law of states already implementing the approach.
VI.

DRAWBACKS OF THE CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSENT
APPROACH AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
While the Contemporaneous Consent Approach maintains
additional safeguards to the process, courts will have to address the
drawbacks to the approach and certain situations in which further
safeguards to the approach must be present. First, with this
approach, there is the chance the parties may never come to a mutual
decision. 173 These disputes arise because the parties cannot agree on
the disposition of their embryos. Thus, requiring an agreement
before any final disposition of the embryos may be ordered by a
court could result in never reaching any conclusion for the
embryos. 174
First, the potential for indefinite storage may suggest the
embryos will exist in “legal limbo” indefinitely. There are many
incentives throughout the process, however, that make it likely the
parties will to come to a mutual decision. Primarily, most parties
prefer to have a quicker divorce and not prolong the process. 175
Further, many IVF clinics have policies that, after a certain point of
non-use, frozen embryos will be thawed and discarded, or donated
to research for administrative and feasibility reasons. 176 Finally,
storage costs range between $300 to $1,200 a year. 177 Thus, in the
See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); In re Marriage of Witten,
672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
173
Amanda West, Reproductive Freedom or Forced Procreation: An Analysis
of Minnesota Statutory Law Dealing with the Parentage of Frozen Embryos after
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absence of a mutual agreement, leaving the embryos stored
indefinitely may not be the most cost-efficient option for couples
already going through an expensive divorce. Not only do these
factors possibly create an end point for the dispute, but they also
create incentives for parties to come to a mutual agreement.
Second, another drawback that accompanies potentially
indefinite storage occurs if one party dies during the time of
indefinite storage. On one hand, the surviving party could argue that
his or her rights now outweigh any of the rights of the deceased, or
that the deceased no longer has rights in the frozen embryos. 178 On
the other hand, the estate of the deceased would argue in favor of
respecting the last wishes of the deceased. 179 The latter argument
most aligns with the understanding of wills, intestate succession,
and posthumous procreation, which maintains that the deceased
party’s wishes should be respected and honored post-mortem. 180 If a
court chooses to respect the last wishes of the deceased, the court
may also allow the surviving party to override the last wishes of the
deceased upon the showing of extreme, or extraordinary changed
circumstances. 181
The third and final drawback of the approach is that parties
entering into IVF contracts may rely on their IVF contracts, making
major life decisions on the assumption the contract will be enforced
by a court. For example, a couple may agree to freeze their embryos
so the woman can focus on her career at that time, but still have the
opportunity to have biological children at a later time. The couple
then signs a contract stating she will be awarded the embryos in the
event of a divorce. Thus, the woman proceeds with her plans of
pursuing her career with the confidence, should anything happen,
she would be awarded the embryos and still have the opportunity to
have biological children of her own. Years later, at the time of the
divorce, however, the husband has a change of heart and no longer
wants his wife to be awarded the embryos. The Contemporaneous
178
John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1047
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179
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Consent Approach would honor this change of heart, and not force
parentage on the husband despite the contract. In this situation,
however, the woman made major life decisions relying on the
enforceability of the contract. The notions of fairness and equity in
contract law suggest the woman’s reliance should be dispositive to
the court, and the contract should be enforced if no other remedy is
appropriate. 182 Under the Contemporaneous Consent Approach,
however, the woman’s reliance has no effect on the enforceability
of the IVF contract. While there are no perfect solutions to this
drawback, there is an option to mitigate some of the consequences
that accompany reliance on IVF contracts.
To address this drawback, under the Contemporaneous Consent
Approach, drafters of the IVF contract should make parties aware
that the disposition of the frozen embryo provision in their IVF
contract may be unenforceable at the time of divorce. Placing
unenforceable clauses in contracts is often done in other family law
contracts. 183 For example, parties often place child custody
provisions in prenuptial and separation agreements despite their
inability to be enforced by a court. 184 In practice, drafters of the
contract are required to put the parties on notice that if a dispute
arises, the provisions will not be enforced despite those provisions
being in the contract. This unenforceability principle can be applied
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“Enforcement by Virtue of Action in Reliance (1) A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the
promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance is
enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise.”).
183
See Ariel Baniowski, Unenforceable Custody and Support Provisions in
Separation Agreements, LIVESAY & MYERS (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://www.livesaymyers.com/unenforceable-custody-support-provisionsseparation-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/28JK-QSR6] (“[A] provision in a
separation agreement may state that ‘In the event either of the parents of the
children were to die, the surviving grandparents shall receive visitation with the
children every other weekend.’ Unfortunately, such a provision would be
unenforceable.”).
184
Id. (“[A] provision [in a prenuptial agreement] may read ‘In the event the
mother [the primary physical custodian] moves more than 30 miles from the
father’s current residence [the minority custodian], primary physical custody shall
automatically transfer to the father.’ A provision like that is unenforceable.”).
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to IVF contracts so that any reliance on the IVF contract would be
unjustified. Thus, parties would be less likely to make major life
decisions on the assumption the contract would be enforced at the
time of divorce.
Although the Contemporaneous Consent Approach has its
drawbacks, it is still the appropriate method of IVF contract
interpretation and enforcement for states still looking for guidance.
Since the approach is only implemented in a few states, there have
not been many opportunities for courts to address all of the
drawbacks that come with the approach. As more states adopt this
approach, however, many of the drawbacks listed above may be
encountered. Once these issues arise with higher frequency, it will
allow courts to develop creative solutions such as the proposed
solutions above for other courts to follow.
VII. CONCLUSION
Assisted Reproductive Technology has rapidly expanded in
ways that many courts are continuing to grapple with. The legal and
ethical implications of ART are vast, and courts have struggled to
remain uniform in their decisions during frozen embryo disputes.
Although many states have addressed through case law or statute
what will happen during a frozen embryo disposition dispute, many
states have yet to address the issue at all. This lack of clarity and
uniformity leaves couples pursuing IVF in those states vulnerable
and subject to significant uncertainty regarding the disposition of
their frozen embryos, even when they sign contracts.
States looking for guidance should adopt the Contemporaneous
Consent Approach. This approach is the most protective of all of the
competing interests at stake because it offers an additional safeguard
to the Pure Contractual Approach, honors parties’ potential for a
change of heart, and protects the procreative liberty of the parties.
Although the approach has its weaknesses, as more states adopt this
method of IVF contract interpretation and enforcement, courts will
be able to develop creative solutions to mitigate many of the
drawbacks. All things considered, with the Contemporaneous
Consent Approach, couples pursuing IVF can feel confident that
their contracts will be honored, absent a change of heart, while their
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rights and interests are protected throughout their entire IVF
journeys.
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Appendix A: United States Map of Judicial IVF Contract
Interpretation and Enforcement Approaches 185

Tennessee: Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); New York: Kass
v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Massachusetts: A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d
1051 (Mass. 2000); New Jersey: J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001);
Washington: Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002); Iowa: In re
Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); Texas: Roman v. Roman, 193
S.W.3d 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); Oregon: In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194
P.3d 384 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Pennsylvania: Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2012); Illinois: Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct.
2015); California: Findley v. Lee, No. FDI-13-780539 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 11,
2016); Missouri: McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016);
Colorado: In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018); Arizona: Terrell
v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681 (Ariz. App. Ct. 2019); Connecticut: Bilbao v. Goodwin,
No. 20078, 2019 WL 5607809 (Conn. Nov. 5, 2019).
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